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I. ISSUE AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue∗
There has been a great deal of debate regarding the application of the theory of
responsibility under the third category of Joint Criminal Enterprise vis-à-vis the crime of
genocide. In the interlocutory appeal decision in the case of Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Appeals Chamber
reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision to grant Brdjanin’s motion for acquittal of a
charge of genocide based on joint criminal enterprise, noting that “[t]he Trial Chamber
erred by conflating the mens rea requirement of the crime of genocide with the mental
requirement of the mode of liability by which criminal responsibility is alleged to attach
to the accused.” This position has been referenced and adopted by trial chambers in both
the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). This memorandum
discusses the relevant jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR regarding joint criminal
enterprise as a mode of liability and the specific mens rea required as an element of
genocide. This memorandum concludes that Brdjanin was correctly decided, both as a
matter of doctrine and policy, and that other Tribunals should follow the Brdjanin
decision.

∗

Issue: There has been a great deal of debate regarding the application of the theory of responsibility under
the third category of Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE3”) vis-à-vis the crime of genocide, with specific
emphasis on the required specific intent mens rea. In the interlocutory appeal decision in the case of
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin,” the ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber decision to grant
accused’s motion for acquittal of a charge of genocide based on JCE 3, noting that “[t]he Trial Chamber
erred by conflating the mens rea requirement of the crime of genocide with the mental requirement of the
mode of liability by which criminal responsibility is alleged to attach to the accused.” This position has
been referenced and adopted by trial chambers in both the ICTY and ICTR. Set forth and analyze the
relevant jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR regarding JCE3 as a mode of liability and the specific mens
rea required as an element of genocide, with particular emphasis on the Appeals Chambers. Adopt a
position in support of or against the ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber position and justify your position.
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B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The Brdjanin decision expanded the theory of joint criminal enterprise to
cover those leaders who were reckless or indifferent to the circumstances
leading to genocide, even though they may not have had actual knowledge of
those circumstances.
In order to prove an accused’s criminal responsibility for genocide or other crimes
provided for in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR under the theory of joint criminal
enterprise, the prosecution must now prove “the participation of the accused in the
common plan.”1 The crime itself need not have previously arranged, but may
“materialize extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons
acts in unison to put the plan into effect.”2 Finally, it is not necessary that the accused
was aware that such crimes were the possible consequence of an enterprise, but instead
that the accused was reckless or indifferent to that risk.

2. Following Brdjanin, the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Karemera upheld the
expansive interpretation of joint criminal enterprise, holding that a
defendant could be found guilty of genocide under the theory of
responsibility of JCE3.
Karemera reinforced the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber’s decision, finding that
customary international law precedent supports the expanded theory of joint criminal
enterprise. Furthermore, the court stated that even if the joint criminal enterprise
extended across an entire region, the accused may still be liable where the crimes that
occurred were forseeable.

1

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, at para. 260 (September 2004)[reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]; See also, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, ase No. IT-94-1, Appeals
Judgment, at para. 227 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
2

Brdjanin, Judgment, at para. 262 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
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3. The Appeals Chamber decision in Stakic determined that joint criminal
enterprise is a form of criminal participation governed by broader principles
of derivative liability than had previously been allowed.
Specifically, the Appeals Chamber in Stakic applied a very similar standard for
liability under joint criminal enterprise applied by the Appeals Chamber in Brdjanin, i.e.
that the crimes alleged were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the acts of the
accused, even if the accused did not have specific knowledge of the crimes.

4. The Brdjanin decision provided courts with an improved theory of
participatory liability so that those criminally responsible for mass atrocities
can be prosecuted even without proof of direct knowledge.
The expanded theory of joint criminal enterprise provides a mode of proving the
intent element of a crime through reasonable foresight.
5. A reduced mens rea requirement to prove involvement in a joint criminal
enterprise is a practical way to ensure that those leaders responsible for mass
atrocities are held liable.
Due to the complex and vast nature of international crimes of war added to the
fact that many cases pending before the ICTY and the ICTR involve multiple defendants,
an expanded version of joint criminal enterprise liability is practical. To legitimize the
Brdjanin decision, and ensure that it is used fairly, a reduced sentence for an accused
convicted of genocide under JCE3 is necessary.
6. As long as the leaders most criminally responsible are the ones being
implicated, not their subordinates, then the Brdjanin theory of joint criminal
enterprise poses little threat to the legitimacy of international tribunals.
7. By imposing evidentiary standards that the prosecution must meet to prove
the accused’s involvement in a joint criminal enterprise, trial chambers can
promote a just and fair result.
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Such requirements would both restrict the scope of the joint criminal enterprise
the prosecution is able to charge, and would help ensure that the joint criminal enterprise
theory of criminal responsibility is used primarily for senior leaders, especially in the
case of genocide charges.
8. The Brdjanin decision serves a practical purpose within the context of trial
chamber judgments, because it helped to reinforce the methods of
adjudication that some trial chambers were already carrying out.
The Appeals Chamber in Rwamakuba affirmed the Brdjanin decision, and the
opinion of the Chambers clearly illustrates why the Brdjanin decision is useful for trial
chambers in international tribunals.
9. If prosecutors want to rely on the Brdjanin decision to convict defendants
under the theory of joint criminal liability, they must follow the proper trial
procedures in order to avoid potential pitfalls illustrated by the cases of
Rwamakuba, Ntagerura, and Krnojelac.
The theory of joint criminal enterprise must be pleaded specifically in the indictment
for the trial chambers to recognize it.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Brdjanin Trial
During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the 1990 elections,
the Bosnian Serb leadership formed the Assembly of the Serbian People, which
developed a scheme to create an ethnically-cleansed Bosnian Serb state, also known as
the “Strategic Plan.”3 Radoslav Brdjanin was named President of the Autonomous
Region of Krajina in May 1992, and he enjoyed substantial political influence over

O-Rourke, Recent Development: Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdjanin: Misguided Overcorrection, 47
HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 316 (2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
3
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Serbian paramilitary groups.4 Brdjanin promoted the Strategic Plan, and his political
position enabled him to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Croats and Muslims
through a nefarious propaganda campaign. He also placed all of the instruments of state
power in the hands of the Serb governing bodies and those persons committed to an
ethnically pure Serb state.5
The indictment against Brdjanin consisted of 12 charges including genocide;
complicity in genocide; crimes against humanity by persecution, extermination, torture,
deportation, and inhumane acts; grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions by willful
killing, torture, and unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of
property; and violation of the laws or customs of war by wanton destruction or
devastation of villages and religious institutions.6
The prosecution did not allege that Brdjanin physically perpetrated any of the
crimes. Instead, the prosecution alleged that he was criminally responsible for each of
the crimes listed in the indictment for having participated in a joint criminal enterprise
under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Specifically, the prosecution argued that
Brdjanin should be subject to individual criminal responsibility “pursuant to an extended
form of joint criminal enterprise, the purpose of which was the commission of the crimes
of deportation and forcible transfer, whereby the commission of the other crimes charged
in the Indictment was alleged to have been a natural and foreseeable consequence of the

The Editorial Staff of International Legal Materials, ICTY: Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, The
American Society of International Law (October 2004) http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0717.htm#j2
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
4

5

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

6

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Sixth Amended Indictment (December 2003)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]; O’Rourke, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 317. [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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perpetration of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer.”7 This “extended form” of
joint criminal enterprise is commonly referred to as JCE3.
B. The Trial Chamber Decision
The Trial Chamber ultimately held that:
the specific intent required for a conviction of genocide was incompatible with the
lower mens rea standard of a third category joint criminal enterprise. A third
category joint criminal enterprise requires that the Prosecution prove only
awareness on the part of the accused that genocide was a foreseeable consequence
of the commission of a separately agreed upon crime. This awareness of the
likelihood of genocide being committed is not as strict a mens rea requirement as
the specific intent required to establish the crime of genocide. 8
The Trial Chamber also concluded that the mens rea required to prove criminal
responsibility under the third category of joint criminal enterprise fell short of the
threshold necessary for a conviction of genocide under Article 4(3)(a) of the ICTY
Statute.9
C. The Prosecution’s Appeal
The prosecution filed an appeal arguing that the Trial Chamber erred in law in
concluding that the third category of joint criminal enterprise is incompatible with the
specific intent requirement of genocide. 10 The crux of the prosecution’s argument was
that the Trial Chamber confused the mens rea required for the offence of genocide with
the mental state required to establish criminal responsibility under a particular mode of

7

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (September 2004)[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
8

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal (March 2004) at
para. 2 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
9

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

10

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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liability.11 The prosecution reasoned that while the two concepts of mens rea are related,
they are not the same. The prosecution then asked the Appeals Chamber to reverse the
Trial Chamber Decision and to reinstate the proceedings on the charge of genocide under
the third category of joint criminal enterprise liability. 12

D. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
The Appeals Chamber subsequently concluded that an accused convicted of a
crime under the third category of joint criminal enterprise “need not be shown to have
intended to commit the crime or even to have known with certainty that the crime was to
be committed.”13 Rather, the Appeals Chamber stated that “it is sufficient that that
accused entered into a joint criminal enterprise to commit a different crime with the
awareness that the commission of that agreed upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable
to him that the crime charged would be committed by other members of the joint criminal
enterprise, and it was committed.”14 In a case alleging genocide, the Appeals Chamber
held that the prosecution should only be required to establish that “it was reasonably
foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Article 4(2) would be committed and
that it would be committed with genocidal intent.”15 If this “reasonably foreseeable”
standard is established, criminal liability can attach to an accused for any crime

11

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

12

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Prosecution’s Appeal From Trial Chamber’s Decision
Pursuant to 98bis (December 2003) at paras. 6-8 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

13

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, (March 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

14

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

15

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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committed in relation to the joint criminal enterprise, even if that crime falls outside the
boundary of what the accused specifically agreed to or had knowledge of.16

The Appeals Chamber ultimately found that the Trial Chamber erred by
conflating the mens rea requirement of the crime of genocide with the mental
requirement of the mode of liability by which criminal responsibility is alleged to attach
to the accused. The Trial Chamber’s decision to acquit Brdjanin of genocide, with
respect to the third category of joint criminal enterprise liability, was reversed.

E. The Final Judgment

Despite the interlocutory appeal decision holding that joint criminal enterprise
was a mode of liability for which Brdjanin could be held criminally responsible for
genocide and other crimes, in its final judgment, the Trial Chamber acquitted him for
both genocide and complicity in genocide under the theory of joint criminal enterprise.
The Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish a common plan
amounting to an agreement between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the
crimes in question to commit the crime of genocide envisaged in the ICTY Statute.17 It is
not disputed that Brdjanin promoted the Strategic Plan. It is also not disputed that many
of the relevant physical perpetrators who carried out the objectives of the Strategic Plan
were from various paramilitary organizations. However, these two events did not add up
to an arrangement between the two entities to commit genocide. According to the Trial

16

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

17

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (September 2004) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

17

Chamber, the accused and the physical perpetrators “could espouse the Strategic Plan and
form a criminal intent to commit crimes with the aim of implementing the Strategic Plan
independently from each other and without having an understanding or entering into any
agreement between them to commit a crime.”18

The Trial Chamber also examined whether an agreement could be inferred from
the fact that the accused and the physical perpetrators acted in unison to implement the
Strategic Plan. However, given the distance between the accused and the physical
perpetrators and the fact that most of the physical perpetrators had not been found or
identified, the Trial Chamber was not convinced such an agreement existed. The theory
of joint criminal enterprise was therefore dismissed as a mode of liability, and Brdjanin
was found not guilty of genocide, complicity in genocide, and extermination.19 He was
sentenced to 32 years imprisonment for other crimes, however.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Effect of the Brdjanin Decision on Other Trials
Based on the Brdjanin decision, the prosecution must now prove only “the
participation of the accused in the common plan involving the perpetration of one of the
crimes provided for in the Statute.”20 The common plan must also involve “an
understanding or an agreement between two or more persons that they will commit a
crime.”21 The crime itself need not have been previously arranged, but “may materialize

18

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

19

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

20

The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, at para. 260 (September 2004)[reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]; See also, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, ase No. IT-94-1, Appeals
Judgment, at para. 227 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
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extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison
to put the plan into effect.”22 In other words, the common plan may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances.23
Participants in a joint criminal enterprise may contribute to the common plan in a
variety of ways. The term participation is defined broadly and may include assistance in,
contribution to, or execution of the common plan. An accused’s involvement in the
criminal act must still form a link in the chain of causation.24 This means that, at a
minimum, the prosecution must establish that the accused took action in furtherance of
the criminal plan. However, it is not necessary that the participation be a conditio sine
qua non, or that the offence would not have occurred but for the accused’s participation.25
Moreover, the mens rea requirement for criminal liability under the third category
of joint criminal enterprise is dependent upon the subjective state of mind of the accused.
To establish the mens rea requirement, the prosecution must prove that “the accused was
aware that such a crime was a possible consequence of the execution of that enterprise,
and, with that awareness, participated in that enterprise.” For example, in the Tadic
Appeals Judgment, which the Brdjanin Trial Chamber cited with approval, the Appeals
Chamber explained the mens rea requirement as follows:
21

The Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Appeals Judgment, paras. 97 and 99 (April
2004)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; See also, The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25-A, Judgment, at paras. 80-82 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. The Trial
Chamber interprets the Krnojelac Appeal Judgment as requiring an agreement between an accused and the
principal offenders for the first and third category of joint criminal enterprise, while not requiring proof that
there was a more or less formal agreement between all the participants in the second category of JCE as
long as their involvement in a system of ill-treatment has been established.
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Brdjanin, Judgment, at para. 262 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
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Criminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common
enterprise where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence
of the execution of the common design and the accused was either reckless or
indifferent to that risk. . . What is required is a state of mind in which a person,
although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the
actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless
willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required
(also called “advertent recklessness” in some national legal systems).26
Thus, even if the prosecution cannot affirmatively prove that the accused actually knew
that a predictable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise’s activities could be death
or destruction, he or she can still be held liable for their recklessness or indifference to
the possible risk of such a result.
B. The Karemera Trial
The first cases directly impacted by the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber decision have
been those involving large scale joint criminal enterprises, where the accused are
“structurally remote from the triggermen,” and therefore it is ambiguous as to whether or
not the accused had actual knowledge of crimes carried out by the joint criminal
enterprise.27 The Prosecutor v. Karemera is one such case. When the genocide occurred
in Rwanda, Karemera held a top leadership position in Rwanda’s Mouvement
Revolutionnaire Nationale pourle Developpement (“MRND”).28 Members of this
political party attended meetings where decisions about how the genocide would be

26

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment, at paras. 204 and 220 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 9]; Allen O-Rourke, Recent Development: Joint Criminal Enterprise and
Brdjanin: Misguided Overcorrection, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 321 (2006) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 22].
27

Id. O-Rourke, at 321 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22]
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The Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, “Amended Indictment” (February 2005)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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carried out were made.29 The MRND also controlled the funds used to fuel the genocide
through the purchase of weapons.30 Members of the MRND, including Karemera, were
also involved in training the Interahamwe, the youth militia that became the arms and
legs of the genocide.31
One of the issues in Karemera, a case which is still a pending, is that very little
evidence exists to prove that the accused carried out the charged crimes or that he formed
any agreements with the Interahamwe. Consequently, the prosecution needed to use a
theory of liability under which Karemera could be found culpable despite the lack of
concrete evidence proving that he physically perpetrated genocide or that he knowingly
agreed to commit genocide through a conspiracy.

The prosecution opted to proceed under the third category of joint criminal
enterprise, arguing in the indictment that the accused was criminally responsible for
genocide, complicity in genocide, and rape, because those crimes were “the natural and
foreseeable consequences of the execution of the object of the joint criminal enterprise,
and that the accused was aware that such crimes were the possible outcome of the
execution of the joint criminal enterprise.”32 The prosecution cited to the Appeals
Chamber decision in Brdjanin to support this position.

29

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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The Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, Amended Indictment (February 2005) at para. 7
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On appeal, Karemera challenged the prosecution’s broad interpretation of joint
criminal enterprise. First, he argued that “the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to impose third
category joint criminal enterprise liability for crimes committed by participants in a vast
joint criminal enterprise – particularly those structurally or geographically remote from
the accused – because the Appellant sees no evidence specifically showing that
customary international law permits imposition of third category joint criminal enterprise
liability for their crimes.”33 Second, Karemera argued that “the Tribunal lacks
jurisdiction to consider third category joint criminal enterprise liability when there is no
direct relationship alleged between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the
crime.”34

The Appeals Chamber rejected the above portion of Karemera’s arguments and
concluded that there is indeed customary international law precedent for the third
category of joint criminal enterprise liability. 35 Moreover, the court stated, “not once has
either Appeals Chamber suggested that joint criminal enterprise liability can arise only
from participation in enterprises of limited size or geographical scope.”36 The Appeals
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The Prosecution v. Karemera, Case Nos. ICTR-98-44-AR72.5, ICTR-98-44-AR72.6, Decision on
Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, at para. 14 (April 2006)[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 11].
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The concept that the broadening of the theory of joint criminal enterprise was in part a harkening back to
fundamental principles of customary international law as well as international humanitarian law is
discussed further in this memo in a later section.
Here, the Appeals Chamber directly cited The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, “Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal,” (March 2004) to reinforce the broader theory of joint criminal enterprise procured by the Appeals
Chamber in Brdjanin. The Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case Nos. ICTR-98-44-AR72.5, ICTR-98-44-AR72.6,
Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, at para. 16 (April 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 11]; Additionally, as a matter of policy, the Appeals Chamber opined that
even though the appellant argued that it would be bad public policy to permit third category joint criminal
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Chamber cited the Tadić judgment to support their conclusion that liability may be
imposed on an accused for involvement in a joint criminal enterprise that spans across a
large region.37 The opinion states that liability may be imposed “in a situation in which
murders are committed as a foreseeable but unintended consequence of a joint criminal
enterprise that seeks ‘to forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their . . .
region.’”38 Finally, the Appeals Chamber limited third category joint criminal enterprise
culpability to situations involving crimes that were foreseeable.39 Thus, “to the extent that
structural or geographic distance affects foreseeability, scale will matter.”40

C. The Stakic Trial

Dr. Milomir Stakic was a leading political figure in the Municipality of Prijedor in
1992.41 Stakic served as President of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, an organization whose
members acted in concert in the planning of hostilities against the non-Serb community
in Prijedor.42 Specifically, the Crisis Staff worked in concert with the military and police
authorities to plan attacks against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. 43 The Crisis

enterprise liability for crimes committed by participants in “vast JCEs,” and that permitting this kind of
liability would produce unfair convictions, the Appeals Chamber considered this to be “unfounded.”
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Staff also established and controlled the brutal concentration camps at Omarska,
Trnopolje, and Keraterm.44

The Trial Chamber found Stakic guilty of persecution and extermination as
crimes against humanity and murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war. The
Trial Chamber found him not guilty of genocide, complicity in genocide, and forcible
transfer.45 Stakic was sentenced to life imprisonment, and both Stakic and the
prosecution appealed the judgment.
The Appeals Chamber hearing took place in 2005, after Brdjanin had been
decided. In its decision, the Trial Chamber had rejected the application of joint criminal
enterprise as a mode of liability for the crimes pleaded in the indictment, and instead
applied a new mode of liability it termed “co-proprietorship.” Accordingly, the Appeals
Chamber scrutinized the Trial Chambers’ misapplication of liability, on its own accord,
proprio motu.46

The Appeals Chamber found that although the indictment did not expressly refer
to joint criminal enterprise as a mode of liability, the factual allegations therein relied in
part on the third category of joint criminal enterprise, namely, “the participation of the
accused in the common plan involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for
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The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, “Judgment,” at para. 90 (July 2003)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
Summary of Appeals Judgment for Milomir Stakic, U.N. Judgment Summary, the Hague (March
2006)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Id. The Appeals Chamber noted that the introduction of “new modes of liability” into Tribunal
jurisprudence may generate uncertainty and confusion, to the determination of what the law is and how the
Trial Chambers should apply it. The Appeals Chamber chose to intervene proprio motu to assess the mode
of liability that would best serve the Stakic decision. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at 14].
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in the Statute.”47 The Appeals Chamber concluded that Stakic was responsible for the
war crimes of murder and for the crimes against humanity of extermination and murder
under the third category of joint criminal enterprise.48

Stakic had argued in his appellate brief that “the Trial Chamber impermissibly
enlarged the mens rea requirement” for the crimes implicated in the joint criminal
liability charge-namely murder, extermination, and persecution as crimes against
humanity, as well as murder as a war crime.49 The Appeals Chamber rejected this
argument and reiterated that the use of dolus eventualis within the context of the third
category of joint criminal enterprise did not violate the principles of nullum crimen sine
lege and in dubio pro reo.50 Plainly, the Appeals Chamber in Stakic applied a very
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The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (September 2004), at para. 260. [reproduced
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The term dolus eventualis refers to “where a perpetrator foresees consequences other than those
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criminal act.” David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence
from the International Criminal Tribunals, TEXAS INT’L L.J. 37 (2001-2002) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; See generally, E. Van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as
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similar standard for liability under joint criminal enterprise applied by the Appeals
Chamber in Brdjanin, i.e. that the crimes alleged were reasonably foreseeable
consequences of the acts of the accused, even if the accused did not have specific
knowledge of the crimes.51 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber in Stakic accepted the
broader view of the mens rea standard required for an accused to be convicted of joint
criminal enterprise, even though the prosecution’s indictment did not specifically refer to
joint criminal enterprise.52

F. The Brdjanin decision provided courts with an improved theory of
participatory liability so that those criminally responsible for mass
atrocities can be prosecuted even without proof of direct knowledge
Critics of the broader interpretation of joint criminal enterprise liability assert
arguments similar to those the defense asserted in the Brdjanin interlocutory appeal.53
First, they argue that the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of the joint criminal enterprise

The principle of dubio pro reo articulates that any ambiguity must accrue to the defendant’s
advantage. Tadic Sentence Increased to 25 Years Imprisonment,U.N. Press Release, The Hague
(November 1999)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab17].
51

The Appeals Chamber found Stakic not guilty of genocide, but guilty of other crimes against humanity.
Stakic’s prison sentence was set to forty years. Summary of Appeals Judgment for Milomir Stakic, U.N.
Judgment Summary, The Hague (March 2006)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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The Appeals Chamber noted that “although the Indictment does not expressly refer to categories of joint
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doctrine allows for abuse and overreach.54 These critics argue that the Brdjanin decision
violates the principle of individual culpability, “namely that nobody may be held
criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or
in some other way participated.”55 Similarly, these critics argue that the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise as it is now interpreted under Brdjanin has the potential to lapse into
“guilt by association,” thereby undermining the fairness and legitimacy of international
criminal law.56 The argument is that defendants may be unjustly convicted for “the
violent trauma experienced by entire nations.”57 Similarly, others argue that certain
forms of joint criminal enterprise that tolerate a reduced mens rea requirement should not
be used in cases involving specific intent crimes such as genocide and persecution.58
These arguments misjudge the fairness and legitimacy of the Brdjanin decision, a
rationale that has helped to clarify the theory participatory liability in the context of the
mass atrocities. Participatory liability has its own mental element through which the
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Allen O-Rourke, Recent Development: Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdjanin: Misguided
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mental element of the underlying crime is established.59 As Judge Shahabuddeen
reasoned in his dissenting opinion to the Brdanin appeal judgment:
In my respectful interpretation, the third category of joint criminal enterprise . . .
provides a mode of proving intent in particular circumstances, namely, by proof
of foresight in those circumstances. (...)60

Critics argue that genocidal intent is such a distinctive element of the crime that it always
requires proof of “intent to destroy.”61 However, special intent crimes like genocide are
governed by general principles of derivative liability, thus genocide can be proven by
relying on the mens rea and actus reus of criminal participation.62 The intent element
may be proved through a foresight test. A participant in genocide does not need to have
genocidal intent himself or herself before a conviction for genocide can be entered.63
G. A reduced mens rea requirement to prove involvement in a joint criminal
enterprise is a practical way to ensure that those leaders responsible for mass
atrocities are held liable.
Next, critics of the Brdjanin decision argue that unlike cases such as Tadic, where
the alleged joint criminal enterprise covered single municipalities, Brdanin involved an
enormous joint criminal enterprise covering an entire region. Like the defense in

E. Van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide, 5 J.
Int’l Criminal Justice, note 106 (March 2007)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab18].
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Brdjanin, they argue that the joint criminal enterprise doctrine was not intended to apply
to such enormous crimes.64
All of the arguments stated above are based in part on the principle of individual
culpability, which is the foundation of many domestic criminal law systems, and the idea
that an individual should only be punished for conduct for which he is personally
responsible.65 I would argue that because of the nature of international crimes and
because many of the cases pending at the ICTY and ICTR involve multiple defendants, a
somewhat reduced mens rea requirement for genocide cases being tried under the theory
of joint criminal responsibility should be allowed. One way to combat the notion that an
accused could be unfairly punished for genocide via the joint criminal enterprise mode of
liability is to lower the sentence of an accused convicted of genocide under JCE3. Trial
chambers already allow plea and sentence bargaining during the pre-trial phase as a
means to stipulate certain facts, charges, and possible sentences for an accused.
Similarly, a reduced sentence stipulated for a conviction of joint criminal enterprise vis-àvis genocide could help prosecutors fairly and legitimately utilize the extended theory of
joint criminal enterprise.
H. As long as the leaders most criminally responsible are the ones being
implicated, not their subordinates, then the Brdjanin theory of joint criminal
enterprise poses little threat to the legitimacy of international tribunals.
International crimes are typically committed by hundreds and thousands of
people. It has been recorded that the Rwandan genocide involved thousands of
[Allen O-Rourke, Recent Development: Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdjanin: Misguided
Overcorrection, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 320 (2006)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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perpetrators, as illustrated by the fact that in 1997 over 120,000 genocide suspects were
detained in Rwandan jails.66 Therefore, some would argue that a broader-reaching
application of joint criminal enterprise puts people other than those most responsible in
jeopardy of liability.67
This argument is easily refutable. Should subordinate leaders be prosecuted in the
Tribunal context, which is unlikely due to the already overflowing docket of cases of
those leaders in the highest bracket of political power, it is unlikely that the prosecution
would use a theory of joint criminal enterprise, because most of the lower subordinate
leaders were actually personally and physically responsible for some of the atrocities
related to genocide. Many of the subordinate leaders in the Rwandan genocide were the
“runners” who physically killed Tutsi and moderate Hutu citizens, or at least they had
personal knowledge and agreed to the killings.
It is those leaders who were in the highest bracket of political power who have
been and are being charged with genocide and other crimes under the theory of joint
criminal enterprise.68 As long as the leaders most responsible for the commission of
crimes on the scale of genocide are the ones being implicated, not their subordinates, then
the Brdjanin theory of joint criminal enterprise poses little harm to the legitimacy of
international tribunals and the interest of justice.

Bernard Muna, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: The Rwanda Tribunal and its
Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (1998) at 1474 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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I. By imposing evidentiary standards that the prosecution must meet to
prove the accused’s involvement in a joint criminal enterprise, trial
chambers can promote a just and fair result.
Critics also argue that the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber overreached by expanding
the forseeability standard of mens rea to specific intent crimes, and by doing so, lowered
the evidentiary standard required for the prosecution to prove an accused’s culpability
with regard to the joint criminal enterprise.69 They argue that the JCE 3, after the
Brdjanin decision, is highly attractive to the prosecution, “raising the possibility of
elegantly overcoming typical evidentiary problems in international criminal law
prosecutions, especially where proof of direct participation is lacking.”70 Thus, critics
argue that the scope of the Brdjanin decision should be limited to a knowledge standard
of mens rea to prove an accused’s culpability with regards to a joint criminal enterprise.
This argument ignores the fact that many Trial Chambers have imposed
evidentiary standards that the prosecution must meet to prove an accused’s involvement
in a joint criminal enterprise when they cannot directly prove the accused’s knowledge.
Instead of seeking to restrict the scope of joint criminal enterprises in an across-the-board
fashion, as many critics of the Brdjanin decision say should be done, trial judges can set
forth more stringent requirements of proving that the defendant has made a substantial
contribution to the joint criminal enterprise charged. These requirements would both
restrict the scope of the joint criminal enterprise the prosecution is able to charge, and
would help ensure that the joint criminal enterprise theory of criminal responsibility is

Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. Int. Criminal Judtice, note 110
(2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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used primarily for senior leaders, especially in the case of genocide charges.71 While
some argue that such a requirement will ban the prosecution’s ability to prove a lowerlevel defendant's contribution to a joint criminal enterprise occurring within a country
over a multi-year period, in the case of the ICTY and ICTR, most of the defendants
standing trial are not lower-level leaders.72
In the Kvocka case, the Trial Chamber identified a series of factors that the
prosecution should prove in order to assess whether an individual's participation in a joint
criminal enterprise is "significant":
(1) the size of the criminal enterprise,
(2) the functions performed,
(3) the position of the accused
(4) the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed,
(5) the efficiency, zealousness or gratuitous cruelty exhibited in performing the
actor's function.73
These factors should guide prosecutors and Trial Chambers in their assessment of
whether an individual has made a substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise
alleged in the indictment.74
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J. The Brdjanin decision serves a practical purpose within the context of trial
chamber judgments, because it helped to reinforce the methods of
adjudication that some trial chambers were already carrying out.
Next, the Brdjanin decision serves a practical purpose within the context of trial
chamber judgments in international tribunals. With the growing complexity of war
crimes, including the complexity of leadership structures in joint criminal enterprises; and
the remoteness of the accused from the actual “triggermen” who physically carry out the
acts of genocide, courts often (before the Brdjanin decision) had difficulty classifying the
criminal responsibility of the accused into existing legal categories of culpability, because
the knowledge standard of mens rea was too high a threshold. As the Appeals Chamber
articulated in the Rwamabuka “Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application
of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide,” post-World-War II cases being
tried before international tribunals did not “always fit neatly into the so-called ‘three
categories’ of joint criminal enterprise . . . in part because the tribunals’ judgments did
not always dwell on the legal concepts of criminal responsibility.”75
Instead, many trial chambers conclude that, based on the evidence, the accused
was either “connected with,” “concerned in,” “inculpated in,” or “implicated in” war
crimes and/or crimes against humanity.76 Indeed, it is more practical for trial chambers to
make their own determinations as to the involvement of the accused in a joint criminal
enterprise. It is clear that trial chambers, after the Brdjanin decision, may now find

Prosecution v. Krnojelac later on also illustrates how the prosecution can plead a theory joint criminal
enterprise with greater specificity.
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criminal responsibility for genocidal acts that are “physically committed by other persons
with whom the accused are engaged in a criminal common purpose.”77 The Appeals
Chamber decision in Rwamakuba discussed above affirmed the Brdjanin decision, and
the opinion of the Chambers clearly illustrates why the Brdjanin decision is useful for
trial chambers in international tribunals.
K. If prosecutors want to rely on the Brdjanin decision to convict defendants
under the theory of joint criminal liability, they must follow the proper
trial procedures in order to avoid potential pitfalls illustrated by the cases
of Rwamakuba, Ntagerura, and Krnojelac
It has been established that the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber decision was correctly
decided, giving prosecutors a means to convict those accused who are responsible for
mass atrocities where some proof of actual knowledge is lacking. It follows that if
prosecutors want to rely on the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber decision to convict defendants
under the theory of joint criminal liability, they must follow the proper trial procedures in
order to avoid pitfalls illustrated in the cases of Rwamakuba, Ntagerura, and Krnojelac.
1. The Rwamakuba Trial
Andre Rwamakuba worked as a doctor and public health specialist in Rwanda.
After the death of President Habyarimana, Rwamakuba was appointed minister of
Primary and Secondary Education in the Interim Government.78 In the indictment, he
was charged with genocide, or alternatively, complicity in genocide regarding acts
allegedly committed in Gikomero commune and at Butare University Hospital.79
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In 2004, before Rwamakuba’s trial began, the prosecution requested the severance
of Rwamakuba from the Joint Indictment. The prosecution stated “that it intended to
focus the case entirely on Rwamakuba’s ‘direct participation in crimes,’” thereby
removing any allegation of conspiracy to commit genocide or joint criminal enterprise
responsibility.80 According to the prosecution, the case against Rwamakuba was to be
based on his own acts and omissions and not an “attempt to bring in proof of
Rwamakuba's meeting and conspiring with other interim government ministers and other
MRND leaders to commit genocide.”81
Accordingly, the prosecution removed from the original indictment those
pleadings regarding ‘common purpose’ that implicated Rwamakuba as a co-perpetrator of
crimes committed in furtherance of a government conspiracy to commit genocide in
Rwanda.82 Instead, the prosecution stated that it intended to offer evidence of
Rwamakuba’s ministerial appointment “to prove elements of the prosecution’s case such
as mens rea for genocide.”83 The Trial Chamber agreed to allow the severance of
Rwamakuba from the Joint Indictment.84
It was not until the latest stage of the trial that the prosecution submitted in its
closing brief that Rwamakuba might also have criminal liability attached under the theory
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of joint criminal enterprise or conspiracy. The prosecution argued that Rwamakuba was
responsible as a minister of the Interim Government, for the crimes carried out against
the Tutsi population.85 In response to this new development, the defense argued in its
closing argument that “command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, were out and
that the relevance of his being a minister was confined to disposition and ideology.”86
The Trial Chamber noted that “it would . . . be contrary to the fundamental right
of the Accused to a fair trial, including his right to defend himself and to know the
charges against him, if the Chamber were to accede to a prosecution request to find the
Accused criminally responsible for omissions which were neither set forth in the
Indictment nor subsequently notified by timely, clear, and consistent information from
the prosecution.”87 The court reiterated that “the prosecution is expected to know
its case before it goes to trial rather than seek to mould its case at the end of the trial
depending on how the evidence unfolded.”88
When the final judgment came down, Rwamakuba was acquitted on all charges in
the Indictment.89 The Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution had produced
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insufficient evidence to prove genocide or complicity in genocide, even though the
prosecution had sought to establish that the accused was criminally liable through
conspiracy among other theories. In addition, the Trial Chamber accepted the argument
of the Defense that the accused had sufficient alibi to “levy additional doubt” as to his
culpability and that the prosecution had failed to call any witnesses to rebut this alibi.90
It is possible that the prosecution would have gained a conviction had it left the
theory of joint criminal enterprise liability in the indictment. In 2004, the Appeals
Chamber rejected the Rwamakuba’s interlocutory appeal challenging the Indictment on
grounds that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try him for genocide on a theory of joint
criminal enterprise, because under the doctrine of “common purpose” the accused’s
involvement in a joint criminal enterprise “was confined to crimes with great specificity
in relation to the identity and the relationship between co-perpatrators and victims . . . ”91
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that "liability for participation in a
criminal plan is as wide as the plan itself, even if the plan amounts to 'a nation wide
government-organized system of cruelty and injustice.'"92 Thus, an accused’s liability
under a “common purpose” mode of responsibility in connection with a joint criminal
enterprise may be as narrow or as broad a the plan in which the accused participated.
Consequently, since the Trial Chamber had previously accepted this broad
construction of joint criminal enterprise theory, the prosecution could have benefited
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from the Brdjanin decision had it not made the strategic error of disclaiming joint
criminal enterprise liability in the indictment.
2. The Ntagerura Trial
As in Rwamakuba, had the prosecution in Ntagerura left the theory of joint
criminal enterprise in the indictment, the defendant may have been convicted on at least
that count. In Ntagerura, the prosecution’s first and only attempt at trial to suggest the
theory of joint criminal enterprise liability was in its closing arguments.93 The Trial
Chamber reprimanded this approach, stating:
If the Prosecutor intends to rely on the theory of joint criminal enterprise to hold
the accused criminally responsible as a principal perpetrator of the underlying
crimes rather than as an accomplice, the indictment should plead this in an
unambiguous manner and specify upon which form of joint criminal enterprise
the Prosecutor will rely.94
Additionally, the Chambers stated that the prosecutor must also plead the purpose
of the enterprise, the identity of the co-participants, and the nature of the accused’s
participation in the enterprise.95 The Chambers stated, “an application of the principle
non bis in idem in Article 9 of the Statute depends on the precise and specific particulars
which clearly and unambiguously identify the crime and the accused’s participation in it.
Similarly, a precise indictment is also essential to establishing responsibility for crimes
included in a joint criminal enterprise.”
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Ntagerura was found not guilty on all counts in the indictment.96 A similar
speculation could be made as was articulated regarding Rwamakuba, namely that the
Brdjanin decision on joint criminal enterprise has the potential to help prosecutions gain
convictions in cases such as this one where evidence is not substantial enough to prove a
crime, but may reach the threshold necessary for a lesser liability under joint criminal
enterprise.
3. The Krnojelac Trial
Both Rwamakuba and Ntagura have illustrated that if the prosecution wishes to
use the theory of joint criminal enterprise to support their theory of criminal
responsibility for the accused, they must make it clear as early in the trial process as
possible. The prosecution must plead the theory of joint criminal enterprise with great
specificity and detail, making clear the nature of the accused’s participation in the
enterprise.
One case from the ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, further clarifies the timing
and the specificity with which the prosecution must plead the joint criminal enterprise
theory. In Krnojelac, the Trial Chamber refused to consider whether JCE3 applied,
because the prosecution mentioned the theory for the first time in the Pre-Trial brief.97
The Appeals Chamber upheld this decision and stated that the prosecution must specify
the basis for the accused’s responsibility under the theory of joint criminal enterprise in
the indictment. The Appeals Chamber stated that “it would contravene the rights of the
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defense if the Trial Chamber . . . to chose a theory not expressly pleaded by the
Prosecution.”98 The Appeals Chamber went on to specify what must be pleaded in the
indictment for the prosecution to successfully argue the theory of joint criminal
enterprise:
(1) The nature or purpose of the joint criminal enterprise (it’s “essence”)
(2) The time at which or the period over which the enterprise is said to have
existed;
(3) The identity of those engaged in the enterprise-so far as their identity is
known, but at least by reference to their category as a group; and
(4) The nature of the participation by the accused in that enterprise.99

If the prosecution intends to rely upon an allegation of joint criminal enterprise, it must
do so in a timely manner and plead such allegations with great accuracy and as much
detail as possible.100
IV. CONCLUSION
This memorandum concludes that Brdjanin was correctly decided, both as a
matter of doctrine and policy, and that other Tribunals should follow the Brdjanin
decision. To avoid accusations of overreaching and unfairness to defendants, however,
prosecutors should assert Brdjanin joint criminal enterprise theory only in cases where
they give fair notice to defendants by asserting it in the initial indictment. Moreover,
Tribunals should only Brdjanin joint criminal enterprise liability in cases where it is fair,
in view of all the circumstances, to say that the defendant’s prior agreement to and
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specific involvement in the joint criminal enterprise obviated the need to find specific
intent by that individual defendant to commit genocidal acts carried out in furtherance of
the joint criminal enterprise.
To mark the distinction between the basic and the extended form of JCE with
regard to genocide, where participants in the former have genocidal intent and
participants in the latter do not, conviction and sentence should differ. In the case of
JCE3, a participant should be convicted of participating in genocide rather than of
genocide. Such conviction would carry a lower sentence than committing genocide with
the requisite knowledge or intent mens rea.
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